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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal, we determine that the defendant airline's 
form letter advising a number of passengers that their 
tickets are considered to be stolen may be defamatory to 
the plaintiff travel agency that sold the tickets. We also 
conclude that the preemption provision of the Airline 
Deregulation Act does not apply to this state tort claim. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court's dismissal of 
the plaintiff's defamation claims. 
 
Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. was a travel agency in Princeton, 
New Jersey, specializing in furnishing airline tickets to 
persons traveling to India. Some of these tickets were 
purchased from an authorized agent for Delta Airlines by 
Taj Mahal which, in turn, sold them to its patrons. On a 
number of occasions in 1996 when these tickets were 
presented at the airport in India for the return flight to the 
United States, Delta refused to honor them. The travelers 
were required to purchase new tickets and were given the 
following explanatory form letter: 
 
       "Dear Delta Customer: 
 
        We regretfully must inform you that the ticket 
       presented has been reported as a stolen airline ticket. 
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        It is unfortunate that you have purchased one of 
       these tickets. While we empathize with your 
       predicament, we cannot honor this ticket for 
       transportation because Delta has not yet received the 
       money you paid. To assist you in this difficult 
       situation, we will sell you a new ticket, honoring the 
       fare indicated in you [sic] flight reservation record and 
       waiving any advance purchase requirements. 
 
        It is necessary to retain your ticket in order to assist 
       with the ongoing "law enforcement investigation; 
       however, this letter will serve as your receipt for ticket 
       number [_____]. If you purchased your ticket from an 
       authorized Delta travel agency, please complete the 
       attached affidavit and forward it to Delta Air Lines, Inc. 
       for a refund. If you purchased the ticket from someone 
       not authorized by Delta to sell its tickets, you should 
       contact the individual from whom you purchased the 
       ticket, as Delta has not received any payment for this 
       ticket. 
 
        If this ticket has been issued by a travel agent and 
       you have further questions, you may contact the 
       Agency Audit and Fraud Prevention, Airline Reporting 
       Corporation at (713) 816-8134." 
 
In a complaint against Delta and others filed in New 
Jersey state court, Taj Mahal alleged that the letter was 
defamatory, and caused its patrons not only to demand 
reimbursement, but also to cease doing business with the 
agency. Because of the injury to its reputation and trade, 
Taj Mahal sought compensatory and punitive damages in 
counts asserting defamation and state RICO claims. 
Defendants removed the case to the United States District 




1. Defendant Air Canada was dismissed because of improper service of 
process. Other counts, including a state RICO claim and a claim alleging 
a scheme to shift airline costs to agents such as Taj Mahal and to the 
traveling public, were also dismissed. Plaintiff has not appealed those 
orders. The defamation counts at issue in this appeal were asserted only 
against Delta. 
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Holding that the letter could not reasonably be read to 
have a defamatory meaning, the District Court entered 
judgment on the pleadings for Delta. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). 
The Court further held that even if the letter was found to 
be defamatory, Taj Mahal failed to show that the 
statements were " `of and concerning' the plaintiff." 
According to the Court, "the letter does not mention the 
plaintiff by name . . . . and did not specify by name or 
implication any particular person or entity." Rather, it 
"refers to any number of travel agents without specific 
reference to any particular one." 
 
At a later date, relying on the preemption provisions of 
the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. S 41713(b)(1) 
(formerly at 49 U.S.C. S 1305(a)(1)), the District Court 
entered judgment against the plaintiff on a state RICO 
count. 
 
Plaintiff has appealed the ruling on the defamation 
counts, contending that a reasonable reader could 
understand the letters to accuse Taj Mahal of selling tickets 
for which it had not paid. Moreover, it also asserts that 





Our review of the District Court's dismissal of a 
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) is plenary. See Hayes 
v. Community Gen. Osteopathic Hosp., 940 F.2d 54, 56 (3d 
Cir. 1991). We must accept as true the allegations in the 
complaint, and draw all reasonable factual inferences in Taj 
Mahal's favor. See Turbe v. Government of the Virgin 
Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991). The District 
Court's judgment may be affirmed only if no relief can be 
granted under any set of facts that could be proved. See id. 
 
In this diversity action, the plaintiff's cause of action for 
defamation is governed by the law of New Jersey. To state 
a claim, the plaintiff must prove: (1) that the defendant 
made a defamatory statement of fact; (2) concerning the 
plaintiff; (3) which was false; (4) which was communicated 
to persons other than the plaintiff; and (5) fault. See 
Feggans v. Billington, 677 A.2d 771, 775 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
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App. Div. 1996); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts 
S 558 (1976). Repeating a defamatory statement is itself 
defamation, Kotlikoff v. Community News, 444 A.2d 1086, 
1088 n.1 (N.J. 1982), and a printed defamation is libel. See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 568 (1976). 
 
"A defamatory statement is one that is false and injurious 
to the reputation of another or exposes another person to 
hatred, contempt or ridicule or subjects another person to 
a loss of the good will and confidence" of others. Romaine 
v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284, 287 (N.J. 1988) (internal 
quotation marks removed). A court must look to the"fair 
and natural meaning which will be given it by reasonable 
persons of ordinary intelligence" and examine the 
publication as a whole and in context. Id. at 288. A court 
may determine as a matter of law whether a statement is 
defamatory, assuming that it is capable of only one 
meaning. When the words are capable of either a 
defamatory or non-defamatory construction, however, the 
trier of fact must determine their meaning. See id. False 
written attributions of criminality are defamatory as a 
matter of law. See id. A theft of over $500 is a crime of the 
third degree in New Jersey. See N.J.S.A. S 2C:20-2(b)(2)(a). 
 
Not only must the statement be defamatory, it must also 
be "of and concerning" the plaintiff. A defamatory statement 
need not explicitly name a plaintiff, so long as it was 
understood to refer to it by at least one third party: " `[i]f the 
applicability of the defamatory matter to the plaintiff 
depends upon extrinsic circumstances, it must appear that 
some person who saw or read it was familiar with the 
circumstances and reasonably believed that it referred to 
the plaintiff.' " Gnapinsky v. Goldyn, 128 A.2d 697, 703 
(N.J. 1957) (quoting Restatement of TortsS 564 cmt. b 
(1938)); see also Dijkstra v. Westerink, 401 A.2d 1118, 1120 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) ("It is enough that there is 
such reference to him that those who read or hear the libel 
reasonably understand the plaintiff to be the person 
intended."); Mick v. American Dental Assoc., 139 A.2d 570, 
582 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958) ("When defamatory 
words are directed at a group or class of persons rather 
than an individual, the plaintiff must show that he is a 
member of the defamed class and must establish some 
reasonable application of the words to himself."). 
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Thus, we analyze Delta's form letter by placing ourselves 
in the position of the expected reader, a ticket-purchasing 
patron of Taj Mahal. The letter states that "the ticket 
presented has been reported as . . . stolen," "[i]t is 
unfortunate that you have purchased one of these tickets," 
and "Delta has not yet received the money you paid." The 
letter thus links theft, a criminal offense, to the ticket 
received from Taj Mahal. The "has been reported" 
phraseology does not shield Delta because republication of 
defamatory matter is actionable regardless of the 
republication's accuracy. See Kotlikoff, 444 A.2d at 1088 
n.1 ("It is a well settled rule of defamation law that one who 
republishes libelous matter is subject to liability as if he 
had published it originally, even though he attributes the 
libelous statements to the original publisher."); Rogers v. 
Courier Post Co., 66 A.2d 869, 873 (N.J. 1949); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 578. 
 
In addition, the letter provides: "[i]t is necessary to retain 
your ticket in order to assist with the ongoing law 
enforcement investigation . . . ." Clearly, this emphasizes to 
the reader that some type of criminal misappropriation is 
involved. The text, therefore, permits an inference of 
defamatory meaning. 
 
The question remains whether the letter would lead a 
reasonable reader to conclude that Taj Mahal is in some 
way connected with the purported illegality. We believe that 
it could. To begin with, the patron knows that he paid Taj 
Mahal. The Delta letter notes the reason for refusal to 
"honor this ticket for transportation [is] because Delta has 
not yet received the money you paid." Yet Taj Mahal is the 
only entity with which the patron had contact. 
 
It is reasonable to infer that if Delta did not receive that 
money, then Taj Mahal did not transmit the payment. The 
final sentence of the letter strengthens this assumption: "If 
this ticket has been issued by a travel agent and you have 
further questions, you may contact the Agency Audit and 
Fraud Prevention, Airline Reporting Corporation . . . ." The 
word "fraud" smacks of criminality. 
 
To defeat the colloquium, Delta contends that the letter 
could refer to any number of travel agents or other 
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intermediaries. The reader, however, did not buy his ticket 
from any number of travel agents; he bought it from Taj 
Mahal. The imputation of fraud and dishonesty focuses on 
the agency from whom the passenger purchased the ticket. 
Moreover, the average airline passenger is unlikely to know 
of any intermediaries between the travel agency and the 
airline. Delta concedes as much in its brief: "it is highly 
unlikely that the travelers who purchased tickets from Taj 
Mahal had any idea when they received the letter at issue 
that Taj Mahal was actually `someone not authorized by 
Delta to sell its tickets.' " (Appellee's Brief at 11 n.5).2 
 
A fact-finder might conceivably adopt Delta's contention 
that the letter did not point to Taj Mahal. However, at this 
stage of the litigation, this ambiguity may not be resolved 
against the plaintiff. We conclude, therefore, that the letter 
is capable of defamatory meaning directed at Taj Mahal and 





After entering judgment for Delta on the defamation 
counts, the District Court ruled that Taj Mahal's state RICO 
claim was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act. 
Plaintiff has not appealed the RICO dismissal and, thus, it 
is not before us. Taj Mahal argues that Delta waived the 
preemption defense by not raising it until it moved to 
dismiss the state RICO claim, which occurred after the 
District Court had already dismissed the defamation 
counts. However, the preemption defense is a pure issue of 
law applicable to the defamation counts as well, and could 
be dispositive. See Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 
56 (2d Cir. 1993). Since the parties have briefed and argued 
preemption on appeal, we will consider it. 
 
Interstate, but not intrastate, airline travel was heavily 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In their briefs, the parties dispute the impact that potential 
intermediaries, with or without agent-principal relationships to Delta, 
might have on the plaintiff's defamation claims. Because we conclude 
that the reasonable reader would be unaware of such intermediaries, 
their existence is irrelevant to the disposition of this appeal. 
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regulated by the federal government before 1978. See 
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 
731 (codified at 49 U.S.C. S 1301 et seq. (repealed)). In that 
year, Congress concluded that, generally, open competition 
among airlines, particularly with respect to rates and 
services (e.g., direct or nonstop flights, or locations to which 
planes would fly, etc.) would benefit consumers and the 
economy. See 49 U.S.C. S 1302 (recodified as 49 U.S.C. 
S 40101); see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-1211, at 4-5, reprinted 
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3737, 3740-41. The Airline 
Deregulation Act was drafted to accomplish that result. See 
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 
Stat. 1705 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. SS 40101 et 
seq.). 
 
To ensure that the states would not re-regulate what 
Congress had decided to deregulate, the Act incorporated a 
preemption provision. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378-79 (1992). The provision as 
amended reads: "a State, political subdivision of a State, or 
political authority of at least 2 States may not enact or 
enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the 
force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of 
an air carrier . . . ." 49 U.S.C. S 41713(b)(1).3 
 
In Morales, the Supreme Court concluded that 
preemption prevented states from barring allegedly 
deceptive airline fare advertisements through enforcement 
of their general consumer protection statutes. Giving a 
broad interpretation to the words "relating to," the Court 
held that "[s]tate enforcement actions having a connection 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The original preemption section stated: "no State or political 
subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other political agency of 
two or more States shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, 
standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating 
to 
rates, routes, or services of any air carrier . . . ." 49 U.S.C. S 
1305(a)(1) 
(repealed) (emphasis added). The current preemption section deletes the 
words "rule" and "standard," and substitutes "price" for "rates." However, 
the legislative history of these changes shows that Congress intended no 
substantive change to the meaning of the preemption section. See H.R. 
Rep. No. 103-180, at 305, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 818, 1122; see 
also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-677, at 83, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1715, 1755. 
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with, or reference to, airline `rates, routes, or services' are 
pre-empted." Id. at 383-84. 
 
The Court expressed its concern that "as an economic 
matter . . . state restrictions on fare advertising have the 
forbidden significant effect upon fares." Id. at 388. 
Moreover, preemption in that case would not leave a 
regulatory void "giv[ing] the airlines carte blanche to lie to 
and deceive consumers," because the federal Department of 
Transportation retained its authority to investigate unfair 
and deceptive practices. Id. at 390-91 (citing 49 U.S.C. 
S 1381 (recodified as 49 U.S.C. S 41712)). 
 
Morales did not discuss common law torts, but the Court 
did indicate real limitations to the Act's preemptive scope, 
stating, "we do not, as [defendant] contends, set out on a 
road that leads to pre-emption of state laws against 
gambling and prostitution as applied to airlines," and 
"[s]ome state actions may affect [airline fares] in too 
tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to have pre- 
emptive effect." Id. at 390 (internal quotation marks 
omitted, other alterations in original). 
 
The Court revisited the preemption issue in American 
Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995), determining 
that a state's consumer fraud statute could not be applied 
to American's decision to devalue mileage credits accrued 
by users of its frequent flyer program. See id. at 227-28. 
The Court, however, also held that a common law breach of 
contract suit by program participants was not preempted 
because the claim simply sought to hold the parties to their 
agreements. See id. at 229. 
 
Rather than involving "state-imposed obligations," these 
contracts involved "privately ordered obligations" and "self- 
imposed undertakings," which the Court doubted that 
Congress intended the federal Department of 
Transportation to adjudicate. See id. at 228-29, 232. It was 
also questionable whether Congress wished to "channel into 
federal courts the business of resolving, pursuant to 
judicially fashioned federal common law, . . . contract 
claims relating to airline rates, routes, or services." Id. at 
232. 
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Wolens thus indicated that Morales was not open-ended 
and that preemption did not apply to all state law affecting 
the passenger-airline relationship. Once again, the Court 
did not rule on state tort law claims, but significantly, 
observed that the airline had not urged preemption of 
personal injury claims related to airplane operations. See 
id. at 231 n.7. Moreover, the government in its amicus 
curiae brief stated " `[i]t is . . . . unlikely that Section 
1305(a)(1) preempts safety-related personal-injury claims 
relating to airline operations.' " Id. (quoting Brief for United 
States as Amicus Curiae 20 n.12). Even though the Wolens 
majority did not directly address whether common law torts 
were preempted, several Justices did. Justice Stevens 
argued that "Congress did not intend to give airlines free 
rein to commit negligent acts subject only to the 
supervision of the Department of Transportation, any more 
than it meant to allow airlines to breach contracts with 
impunity." Id. at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). After all, the standard of ordinary care, 
like contract principles, "is a general background rule 
against which all individuals order their affairs." Id. at 236- 
37. 
 
Even Justice O'Connor, dissenting because she urged 
broader preemption than the majority, stated "my view of 
Morales does not mean that personal injury claims against 
airlines are always pre-empted." Id. at 242 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
She cited with apparent approval a number of cases in the 
Courts of Appeals and District Courts that allowed recovery 
in tort cases. See id. at 242-43. 
 
In short, the Supreme Court, although it has not yet 
directly addressed the preemption clause as applied to state 
tort claims, has strongly indicated that they would not be 
barred. Wolens quoted with approval the government's view 
of a general standard against which the issue should be 
considered: "[T]he ban on enacting or enforcing any law 
`relating to rates, routes, or services' is most sensibly read, 
in light of the [Act's] overarching deregulatory purpose, to 
mean `States may not seek to impose their own public 
policies or theories of competition or regulation on the 
operations of an air carrier.' " Id. at 229 n.5 (quoting Brief 
for United States as Amicus Curiae 16). 
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Further, the interpretation of even express preemption 
provisions such as the one in the Act must begin with the 
"presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant 
state law." New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995). 
Even "where federal law is said to bar state action in fields 
of traditional state regulation, we have worked on the 
assumption that the historic police powers of the States 
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that 
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Id. at 655 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
In the absence of definitive guidance from the Supreme 
Court, the Courts of Appeals have struggled with the 
relationship between the Act's preemption clause and state 
tort claims. The rulings have not been consistent, as a 
review of post-Morales appellate case law reveals.4 
 
For example, in Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 
334 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc), the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit found a distinction between activity that was 
related to "services" furnished by an airline, and conduct 
connected with "operation and maintenance" of the aircraft. 
The Court reasoned that a carry-over provision of the 
Federal Aviation Act requiring airlines to carry insurance 
covering liability for personal injuries "resulting from the 
operation or maintenance of aircraft," 49 U.S.C. S 1371(q) 
(recodified as 49 U.S.C. S 41112(a)), indicated 
Congressional intent to exclude such claims from 
preemption and leave them within the scope of state 
common law. See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338-39; see also 
Wolens, 513 U.S. at 231 n.7 (noting 49 U.S.C.S 1371(q)). 
On the other hand, "services" were barred from state 
regulation. See Hodges, 44 F.3d at 339. 
 
In Hodges, a passenger in a plane was injured by a box 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Cases in the District Courts are more numerous and follow a similar 
pattern of inconsistency, including divergent results in cases involving 
defamation claims. Compare, e.g., Chukwu v. Board of Directors British 
Airways, 889 F. Supp. 12, 14 (D. Mass. 1995) (tort claims such as 
slander preempted), aff'd, 101 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 1996), with Fenn v. 
American Airlines, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1218, 1223-24 (S.D. Miss. 1993) 
(slander claim not preempted). 
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that fell from an overhead bin. The Court held that this 
claim was attributable to "operation" of the aircraft rather 
than "services" and hence was not preempted. See id. at 
339-40. The Court conceded, however, that the two 
categories might often overlap. See id. at 339. The Court 
applied a similar dichotomy in Smith v. America West 
Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc), holding 
that when an airline allowed a deranged individual to buy 
a ticket and board the plane, an injury claim that arose 
from the ensuing hijacking was not preempted. See id. at 
347. The opinion suggested a distinction between the 
economic and safety aspects of air travel. See id. at 346-47.5 
 
In one case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
originally adopted an operations/services distinction in 
determining whether tort claims were preempted. See Gee 
v. Southwest Airlines, 110 F.3d 1400, 1406 (9th Cir. 1997). 
However, sitting en banc in Charas v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., Nos. 96-15490, 97-55115, 96-15543, 97-15158, 96- 
15791, 1998 WL 822116 (9th Cir. Nov. 30, 1998), the Court 
abandoned that approach in favor of one focused on the 
Congressional intent of economic deregulation of the airline 
industry. See id. at *1. From that standpoint, the Court 
believed that Congress used the word "services" in reference 
to the "prices, schedules, origins and destinations of the 
point-to-point transportation of passengers, cargo, or mail." 
Id. at *1. 
 
Charas concluded that in context, "service" referred to 
such matters as "the frequency and scheduling of 
transportation," and "the selection of markets" for that 
activity, in short, in a "public utility sense." Id. at *7. The 
term was not intended to include the "provision of in-flight 
beverages, personal assistance to passengers, the handling 
of luggage, and similar amenities." Id. at *1. Consequently, 
Congress did not intend to preempt "run-of-the-mill 
personal injury claims." Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In Public Health Trust v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291 (11th Cir. 
1993), the Court held that personal injury claims based on aircraft 
design defects were not preempted. Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 
F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1993), came to the same conclusion. Both cases 
discussed federal regulations on aircraft design standards. 
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A somewhat different facet of preemption presented itself 
in Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1998). In 
that case, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held 
that a passenger's claims based on an airline's refusal to 
permit him to board were preempted. See id. at 259. The 
Court concluded that "boarding procedures" are "services," 
and that the airline's action was justified by security 
directives promulgated by the Federal Aviation 
Administration. See id. at 258-59. However, the passenger's 
state law claims for false imprisonment and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress were not preempted to the 
extent that they were based on activity distinct from denial 
of boarding because such conduct "too tenuously relates or 
is unnecessary to an airline's services." Id. at 259. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit confronted 
another variation in Travel All Over The World, Inc. v. 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423 (7th Cir. 1996), a 
suit by a travel agency alleging that the defendant airline 
had uttered slanderous and defamatory statements. The 
Court held that the false statements about the plaintiff 
travel agency's activities did not expressly refer to "airline 
rates, routes, or services." See id. at 1433. Moreover, the 
utterances did not have the " `forbidden significant 
[economic] effect' on airline rates, routes, or services, as 
contemplated by Morales." Id. Accordingly, the defamation 
claim was not preempted. 
 
The Travel All Court, however, remanded for further 
consideration of other intentional tort claims based in part 
on the airline's refusal to honor tickets purchased from the 
travel agency. The Court took the view that "intentional 
tort" claims invoke the "enactment or enforcement of a law" 
and are barred by the preemption clause, inasmuch as the 
refusal to board passengers was part of an airline's 
ticketing services. See id. at 1435 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
As is apparent from these cases, attempts to resolve the 
issue of preemption in tort causes of action have been 
hampered by the ambiguous preemption terminology. The 
Supreme Court's efforts to arrive at a practical 
interpretation in Morales and Wolens have not resolved 
questions arising in the tort field. 
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To some extent, some of the Courts of Appeals may have 
read too much into the opinions of Morales and Wolens. In 
neither case did the Supreme Court decide whether state 
tort claims were preempted. Nor did it embrace a dichotomy 
between "services" and "operations." 
 
We agree with those Courts that have found that the 
continued existence of statutorily mandated liability 
insurance coverage is strong evidence that Congress did not 
intend to preempt state tort claims. It would make little 
sense to require insurance to pay for bodily injury claims if 
airlines were insulated from such suits by the preemption 
provision. Indeed, in Wolens, the Supreme Court noted in 
passing the significance of the requirements for liability 
insurance set out in 49 U.S.C. S 1371(q) (recodified as 49 
U.S.C. S 41112(a)). See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 231 n.7. 
Because that provision refers to "operation or maintenance 
of aircraft," it is understandable that some appellate 
opinions have seized upon an operations/services 
dichotomy to articulate a workable analytical framework. 
 
Nevertheless, we do not find it conceptually helpful to 
distinguish "operation or maintenance of aircraft" from 
"service." The approach espoused by the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit in Charas offers a more promising 
solution. It is consistent with Wolens' observation that the 
preemption clause was intended to prevent the states from 
re-regulating airline operations so that competitive market 
forces could function. See Charas, 1998 WL 822116, at *6. 
From that standpoint, the proper inquiry is whether a 
common law tort remedy frustrates deregulation by 
interfering with competition through public utility-style 
regulation. See id. at *7. When state law does not have a 
regulatory effect, it is "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral" 
to be preempted. Morales, 504 U.S. at 390. We consider it 
highly unlikely that claims caused by careening service 
carts and plummeting luggage were to be removed from 
state adjudication. 
 
We conclude that focusing on the competitive forces of 
the market, rather than on a strained and unsatisfactory 
distinction between "services" and "operations," leads to a 
more accurate assessment of Congressional intent. It is 
highly unlikely that Congress intended to deprive 
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passengers of their common law rights to recover for death 
or personal injuries sustained in air crashes. Such a 
massive change from pre-existing policy would hardly be 
imposed without specific statutory language. "It is difficult 
to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove 
all means of judicial recourse for those injured . .. ." 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984). 
 
Freeing airlines from the pervasive control over prices, 
routes, and services that existed previously does not 
require a grant of sweeping immunity from the tort liability 
that existed throughout the regulatory era. If immunity was 
not deemed necessary for the industry during its infancy, it 
is difficult to understand why it would be necessary once 
the carriers were considered strong enough to fly on their 
own into the competitive atmosphere. 
 
Moreover, preemption is inappropriate in the tortfield for 
an eminently practical reason. As Wolens pointed out, the 
Department of Transportation has neither the authority nor 
the apparatus required to superintend contract disputes. 
See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232. That observation applies 
equally to tort disputes. It is significant that Congress 
retained the savings clause of the predecessor statute, 
which preserved "the remedies now existing at common law 
or by statute." Id. at 232 (quoting 49 U.S.C. S 1506 
(recodified as 49 U.S.C. S 40120(c))).6 
 
Applying the foregoing considerations to the case before 
us, we hold that the plaintiff 's defamation claims are not 
preempted and may, therefore, proceed. Application of state 
law in these circumstances does not frustrate 
Congressional intent, nor does it impose a state utility-like 
regulation on the airlines. We therefore conclude that the 
plaintiff's suit is simply "too tenuous, remote, or 
peripheral" to be subject to preemption, even though 
Delta's statements refer to ticketing, arguably a "service." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The savings clause has been amended and recodified, and now states 
that "[a] remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies 
provided by law." 49 U.S.C. S 40120(c). The legislative history states 
that 
the new language was "substituted for 49 App.:1506 to eliminate 
unnecessary words and for clarity and consistency in the revised title 
and with other titles of the United States Code." H.R. Rep. No. 103-180, 
at 276, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 818, 1093. 
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Taj Mahal also asserts a claim for punitive damages. The 
Travel All Court thought that such an award, which 
"represents an `enlargement or enhancement[of the 
bargain] based on state laws or policies external to the 
agreement,' " might be preempted, "provided that it relates 
to airline rates, routes or services." 73 F.3d at 1432 n.8 
(quoting Wolens, 513 U.S. at 233 & n.8). 7 
 
We are not persuaded by that reasoning, however, 
because defamation is so foreign to regulations on prices, 
routes, and services that it is unlikely that an award of 
traditional damages would offend Congressional intent. As 
the Court remarked in Silkwood, "[p]unitive damages have 
long been a part of traditional state tort law" and it was the 
defendant's "burden to show that Congress intended to 
preclude such awards." 464 U.S. at 255. Because the 
defamation claims are not preempted, we conclude that 
customary remedies, including punitive damages, if 
warranted, survive as well. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court will be 
reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 995 F.2d 148, 152 (9th Cir. 1993), 
the Court held that compensatory, but not punitive, damages could be 
received by a passenger who had been "bumped from an overbooked 
flight." 
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GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I approach the two issues in this case in reverse. See, 
e.g., Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1998). 
That is, first, I agree with the holding of this Court that the 
ADA does not preempt a state-law cause of action for 
defamation. However, in reaching the merits of Taj Mahal's 
claim, I cannot agree that the facts giving rise to Taj 
Mahal's cause of action warrant a reversal of the judgment 
of the District Court in favor of Delta. Because I cannot 
conclude that the letter sent by Delta can reasonably be 
determined to be defamatory of Taj Mahal, I dissent. 
 
The majority (Majority Op. at 6), focusses on the following 
highlighted language in the letter, reproduced here in its 
entirety: 
 
       We regretfully inform you that the ticket presented has 
       been reported as a stolen airline ticket. 
 
       It is unfortunate that you have purchased one of these 
       tickets. While we empathize with your predicament, we 
       cannot honor this ticket for transportation because 
       Delta has not yet received the money you paid. To 
       assist you in this difficult situation, we will sell you a 
       new ticket, honoring the fare indicated in yourflight 
       reservation record and waiving any advance purchase 
       requirements. 
 
       It is necessary to retain your ticket in order to assist 
       with the ongoing law enforcement investigation; 
       however, this letter will serve as your receipt for ticket 
       number [___]. If you purchased your ticket from an 
       authorized Delta travel agency, please complete the 
       attached affidavit and forward it to Delta Air Lines, Inc. 
       for a refund. If you purchased the ticket from someone 
       not authorized by Delta to sell its tickets, you should 
       contact the individual from whom you purchased the 
       ticket, as Delta has not received any payment for this 
       ticket. 
 
       If this ticket has been issued by a travel agent and you 
       have further questions, you may contact the Agency 
       Audit and Fraud Prevention, Airline Reporting 
       Corporation at (713) 816-8134. 
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The majority analyzes those highlighted portions. 
Majority Op. at 6-7. In doing so, it makes two assumptions 
in its defamation analysis that are unwarranted by the 
record. First, the majority finds that the highlighted 
language "links theft, a criminal offense, to the ticket 
received from Taj Mahal" and, second, that Delta's letter 
"emphasized to the reader that some type of criminal 
misappropriation is involved." Majority Op. at 6. 
 
The preliminary question for the trial court is whether 
the words at issue are capable of a defamatory meaning. 
Hill v. Evening News Co., 715 A.2d 999 (N.J. Super. App. 
Div. 1998); Scelfo v. Rutgers Univ., 282 A.2d 445 (N.J. 
Super. Law Div. 1971). A defamatory statement is "one that 
is false and `injurious to the reputation of another' . . . or 
subjects another person to a `loss of the good will and 
confidence' in which he or she is held by others." Higgins v. 
Pascack Valley Hosp., 704 A.2d 988, 1002 (N.J. Super. 
App. Div. 1998). If the statement is not capable of a 
defamatory meaning, the trial court should dismiss the 
action as a matter of law. Id. See also Moldea v. New York 
Times Co., 15 F.3d 1137, 1142 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 513 
U.S. 875 (1994) ("It is only when a court can say that the 
publication is not reasonably capable of any defamatory 
meaning and cannot be reasonably understood in any 
defamatory sense that it can rule, as a matter of law, that 
it was not libelous") (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
 
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, courts 
should give the statement its "fair and natural" meaning 
that a person of ordinary intelligence and sensibility would 
give it. Ward v. Zelikovsky, 643 A.2d 972, 978 (N.J. 1994). 
In particular, the court should consider the context in 
which the allegedly defamatory statements were made. 
Molin v. Trentonian, 687 A.2d 1022, 1023 (N.J. Super. App. 
Div.), certif. denied, 704 A.2d 20 (1997), cert. denied, 119 S. 
Ct. 239 (1998). See also Ward, 643 A.2d at 980. 
 
The Delta letter does not rise to the level of attributing 
criminal conduct to Taj Mahal or to any other party. The 
letter merely states that the passenger's ticket was 
"reported" as stolen, and states there is an "ongoing law 
enforcement investigation" underway. Even if the letter 
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could be read as raising a specter of "some type of criminal 
misappropriation," the text does not fall within the types of 
statements found by New Jersey courts to be assertions of 
criminal wrongdoing. This is not, for example, a situation in 
which the publication stated that the plaintiff "may be" 
charged with criminal activity. See Lawrence v. Bauer Pub. 
& Printing Ltd., 446 A.2d 469 (N.J.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
999 (1982). Nor is this a situation in which the plaintiff is 
named as taking an action that could be considered 
indicative of guilt. See Molnar v. Star-Ledger, 471 A.2d 1209 
(N.J. Super. App. Div. 1984) (finding article stating plaintiff 
refused to take lie detector test in arson investigation of his 
building defamatory). Rather, the Delta letter represents an 
attempt to gather information and does not impute criminal 
activity to any party. 
 
Even when there is a clear imputation of criminal 
activity, unlike the case here, courts have upheld summary 
judgment for a defendant. See, e.g., Molin, 687 A.2d at 
1024 (finding no defamation in publishing story about 
alleged stalker when headline indicated plaintiff had been 
arrested; body of story indicated plaintiff had only been 
charged with stalking and not yet convicted). Here, the 
circumstances are much more tenuous than in Molin. Taj 
Mahal is not imputed to have been charged with criminal 
conduct, or even that it will be charged. The reference to an 
"ongoing investigation" is enough, on a reasonable reading, 
to conclude that no one has been charged with any crime 
as yet, or even that no crime has been committed. 
 
The majority's conclusion that the letter accuses someone 
of having stolen the tickets is incorrect. Were that the case, 
it is unlikely that Delta would advise passengers who 
received the letter to contact the person from whom they 
purchased the ticket. The letter itself states that if a 
passenger "purchased the ticket from someone not 
authorized by Delta to sell its tickets, [the passenger] 
should contact the individual from whom you purchased 
the ticket." Read in context, the letter indicates only what 
it says: Delta has questions about the ticket presented, and 
the passenger should contact the party from whom he 
bought the ticket for information or a refund. 
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Nor do the statements in the letter rise to the level of the 
facts of cases that have found statements of sufficient 
ambiguity to send the determination of meaning to a jury. 
See, e.g., St. Surin v. Virgin Islands Daily News, Inc., 21 
F.3d 1309 (3d Cir. 1994) (reversing summary judgment for 
defendant newspaper when article stated that criminal 
charges would be filed against plaintiff "next week"); 
Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1082-83 
(3d Cir. 1988) (finding magazine report of name found in 
files relating to "sting" operation susceptible of non- 
defamatory meaning, and reversing lower court's holding of 
defamation per se); Biondi v. Nassimos, 692 A.2d 103 (N.J. 
Super. App. Div. 1997) (finding statement in public meeting 
that plaintiff had "mob connection" and was going to order 
a "hit" on defendant not defamatory as matter of law and 
susceptible to non-defamatory meaning). 
 
The letter issued by Delta contains no connections 
between Taj Mahal and any possible wrongdoing sufficient 
to make the statements ambiguous. When a passenger 
received a letter, the passenger may have first wondered 
whether Taj Mahal was an authorized or non-authorized 
agent of Delta. Assuming (as the majority does, Majority 
Op. at 7 n.2), a customer was ignorant of that fact, the next 
likely step would be to call and ask Taj Mahal for an 
explanation, which is exactly what the letter instructs. 
 
These actions, although inspired by the statements 
contained in the letter, do not make the statements "false 
and `injurious to the reputation of another' . . . or subject[ ] 
another person to a `loss of the good will and confidence' in 
which he or she is held by others.' " Higgins, 704 A.2d at 
1002 (finding no defamation in employer's letter to plaintiff 
stating it found no substance to plaintiff's accusations 
about another employee). 
 
The District Court was correct in holding the letter was 
not reasonably susceptible to a defamatory meaning and 
did not "state, suggest or imply that the plaintiff was a 
thief." Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the District 
Court granting Delta's motion to dismiss Taj Mahal's 
complaint. 
 
My disagreement with the majority's analysis involves 
still another aspect of Taj Mahal's claim pertaining to its 
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action for defamation. An indispensable prerequisite for a 
defamation action is that the alleged defamatory statement 
be "of and concerning" the plaintiff. Durski v. Chaneles, 419 
A.2d 1134, 1135 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1980) (citing 
Gnapinsky v. Goldyn, 128 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1957)). A party 
claiming to have been defamed must show either that the 
statement referred specifically to it, or that someone 
familiar with the statement reasonably believed that the 
party was in fact intended; proof may be by extrinsic 
circumstances. Scelfo, 282 A.2d at 448. Because the Delta 
letter does not satisfy the threshold standard, i.e. that the 
letter is capable of a defamatory meaning, it cannot as a 
matter of law be deemed defamatory. Hence, I do not reach 
the issue of whether the letter is "of and concerning" Taj 
Mahal. 
 
Because I would affirm the District Court's judgment in 
favor of Delta, but the majority has reversed that judgment, 
I respectfully dissent. 
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